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The majority of the dairy products imported by the United States are intermediate 
products used in food processing. As such, they are demanded for their components 
such as milk fat and protein. The implications of the U.S. tariff structure for import 
demand must be viewed in terms of the tariffs’ effects upon the relative prices of 
imported milk components. In this article we examine the implications of the current 
tariff structure and proposed changes under the Doha Round of international trade 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization. We show that implicit ad valorem 
equivalent tariffs (AVEs) on components vary substantially under the current tariff 
schedule. Proposed changes under the Doha Round would lead to not only a reduction 
in the level of implied tariffs on components, but also a reduction in dispersion. This 
would help to reduce the possibility of distortions due to significant differences in 
component prices across intermediate dairy products.  
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Introduction 
he cornerstones of U.S. dairy policy have been high internal support prices 
coupled with import protection; these have effectively insulated U.S. dairy 
markets from global competition. Under the Uruguay Round trade agreement, quotas 
and other forms of import protection were replaced by tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) for 
many products, in order to improve market access. TRQs involve a low tariff on 
within-quota imports and a higher tariff on over-quota imports.  
In any given year the United States can be either a net importer or net exporter of 
dairy products. When international prices are high relative to domestic prices the 
United States is likely to be in a net export position; when the opposite applies it is 
likely to be a net importer. The impact of changes in U.S. tariffs is obviously of 
relevance only to the latter case, when the United States imports more than it exports. 
In 2004 world prices for most dairy products were below U.S. domestic prices and the 
United States was a net importer. In that year imports on a fat solids basis were 
roughly 5.5 percent of total domestic use; on a protein solids basis the proportion was 
8.0 percent. Imports of protein solids were higher than of milk fat solids since some 
high protein products are not subject to a TRQ (i.e., milk protein concentrates and 
caseins). As a result the fill rates for tariff-rate quota products (proportion of the quota 
actually imported) were high, ranging from 96.8 to 98.7 percent for butter and dry 
dairy products, and 64.4 to 99.6 percent for nine cheese categories. The exception was 
dried skim milk, which had a fill rate of just 13.8 percent. The fill rate for TRQs can 
be less than 100 percent, even when international prices are low, because of technical 
and administrative factors (see de Gorter, 2001).  
Most U.S. dairy imports are intermediate products used in further processing, 
rather than finished dairy products. Products like casein or anhydrous milk fat are 
imported for processing into dairy or other food products. Import demand for such 
intermediate products is increasingly related to their component characteristics – how 
much milk fat or protein each contains, for example. Intermediate products can face 
very different levels of tariffs, and this variation affects the implicit import prices of 
components. A high level of implied protection on the components in one product 
could cause importers to switch to other products whose components have lower 
tariffs and implicit prices. This effect has already been apparent through the growth of 
imported milk protein concentrates (MPCs) for use in cheese processing and imported 
milk fats in food preparations. Under the Doha Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations, new tariff-reduction formulas are being discussed to increase market 
access. Changes in implicit tariffs at the component level could have significant 
implications for import demand.  
This article examines the current structure of tariff protection for U.S. dairy 
imports on both a product and a component basis using the methodology developed by 
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Tellioglu (2006). This article also examines how this tariff structure might change 
under a new trade agreement. We first outline an approach to deriving component 
prices and implicit tariffs from the component content of specific imported 
intermediate products, their world prices, and tariffs. We then modify the approach to 
take account of the fact that some products contain components that have little market 
value. For example, most processors purchase skim milk powder for its protein 
content, not for the lactose and minerals it contains. In fact, cheese processors that use 
skim milk powder must remove the lactose during processing. The implicit price for 
protein must be adjusted to reflect this. Next we apply a method for dividing applied 
tariffs for dairy products into component-level tariffs. The component-level tariffs are 
then converted into ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) to aid comparisons. We develop a 
tariff profile for protein and milk fat and compare AVEs across competing products. 
Finally, we examine the impact of proposed reductions in tariffs under the Doha 
Round on the component tariff profile. 
Several analysts have observed that the analysis of trade liberalization in the dairy 
sector requires that the special characteristics of the sector be taken into account. 
Nicholson and Bishop (2001) discuss some of the special characteristics of dairy trade 
models. Buccola and Iizuka (1997) and Lenz, Mittelhammer, and Shi (1994) examine 
the aggregate characteristic of milk and develop hedonic pricing models to derive 
values for milk components. However, no previous studies have discussed possible 
changes in dairy trade patterns when effective tariffs on key milk components are 
taken into account.  
Methodology for Analyzing Component Prices and 
Tariffs 
ur main aim is to examine the tariff structure for U.S. dairy imports using milk 
components. To simplify the analysis we examine groupings of products that 
share similar characteristics (same end use, common percentage of components, etc.). 
Five classes are defined: cheese products, milk fat products, protein and whey 
products, dried milk high fat (dried milk HF) products, and dried milk low fat (dried 
milk LF) products.  
Cheese products contain a similar balance between protein (21-23 percent) and 
milk fat (28-35 percent) (Chandan, 1997). Imported cheese is used mainly as a 
finished food product, not as an intermediate product used for its protein or milk fat 
content. As its name suggests, products in the milk fat group are characterized by a 
high percentage of milk fat – 90 percent on average. Other components (i.e., protein, 
other solids, moisture) are negligible. This justifies the creation of a single group 
containing spray butter, buttercream, buttermilk, and anhydrous milk fat, among other 
products. Products in the protein and whey group are characterized by a relatively 
O   I. Tellioglu, K. Bailey, D. Blanford 
 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    72
high protein level in comparison to other groups. The group contains casein, 
caseinates, milk protein concentrates (MPCs), and various whey products, including 
whey protein concentrates (WPCs) in both liquid and dried forms. 
Dried milk products, other than those included in the protein and whey group, are 
organized into two different groups based on fat content. Dried milk products 
containing significant amounts of fat (10 percent or more) are termed dried milk HF 
(e.g., dried sour cream). Those containing negligible amounts of fat (less than 10 
percent) are termed dried milk LF (e.g., skim milk powder). The reason for identifying 
two groups on the basis of fat content relates to the method for computing component 
tariffs, which is explained later. 
All five groupings are subdivided by their TRQ status (i.e., quota, QT, and over 
quota, OQ). World prices, component prices, and tariff rates are computed on the basis 
of QT and OQ status. Ad valorem equivalent tariffs are computed to permit 
comparisons across products, components, and TRQ status. 
General Methodology 
As stated earlier, our objective is to examine the tariff structure of U.S. dairy imports 
on both a product and a component basis. A methodology is developed to compute 
market prices and tariffs on a component basis using the unique dairy component 
content of specific dairy products. For example, we are interested in deriving the 
market prices and tariffs for protein in products such as milk protein concentrates and 
casein, and the milk fat prices and tariffs for butter and anhydrous milk fat imports. 
The specifics of the methodology developed by Tellioglu (2006) are contained in 
the technical annex. The methodology first begins with deriving the component prices 
for each dairy product by using the world price and the component content of the 
individual products. Thus, for cheese imports, we can derive both a milk fat and a 
protein price based on the world price of cheese and the percentages of fat and protein 
in cheese. Next, ad valorem tariffs are derived on a component basis by first dividing 
the fixed tariffs for dairy products using the ratio of the values of the components to 
world prices, and then converting to component AVEs by dividing these computed 
tariff shares by the world prices. This results in ad valorem equivalent tariffs for milk 
fat, protein, and other solids components which, when summed, equal the tariff for the 
dairy product.  
The general methodology presented cannot always be applied directly to all dairy 
products. For example, cheese has value due to its unique combination of casein 
protein and milk fat. Skim milk powder, on the other hand, has market value mainly 
because of the protein it contains, not due to the lactose, even though lactose accounts 
for over 60 percent of its volume. The general methodology is adapted to such real 
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technical annex. To ensure that these modifications are clear, an example is also 
supplied in the technical annex.  
Analysis of the Current Tariff Structure 
e now apply our methodology to all five product groups in order to compute 
prices and tariffs under the current tariff schedule. As discussed earlier, each 
product group is further divided into QT and OQ subgroups based on its TRQ status. 
All nonquota HTS lines are eliminated, since imports in 2004 were negligible. Table 1 
contains means, ranges, and coefficients of variation (CVs) for estimated world prices, 
total AVE tariffs, component prices, and component AVE tariffs. The CV (ratio of 
standard deviation to the mean) is used as a measure of dispersion.  
As might be expected under the TRQ system, the QT tariffs for the components 
are much lower than the OQ tariffs. Tariffs on finished and intermediate products are 
higher than the implicit tariffs on individual components. Component AVE tariffs for 
groups other than cheese are highly variable for OQ products. For example, the CV 
for protein ranges from 36 to 60 percent, and the CV for milk fat ranges from 31 to 65 
percent. Since, as noted above, many dairy products are imported for their 
components, it is likely that the variability in the implicit tariff will have an impact on 
importers’ decisions on component sourcing.  
The world prices of cheese products show substantial variation. For example, for 
QT products, prices range from $2,000 to $19,500 per ton, and for OQ cheese 
products the range is from $2,000 to $16,000 per ton; the respective CVs are 65 and 
51 percent. The AVE tariffs for cheese, for both QT and OQ, are moderate with a wide 
degree of variation. These results are reflected in the protein and milk fat prices and 
AVEs. 
World prices for QT and OQ milk fat products have moderate ranges. The QT 
range is from $1,762 to $2,077 per ton, and the OQ range is from $2,035 to $3,000 per 
ton (the CVs of world prices are 8 and 15 percent, respectively). With regard to 
component AVEs, the QT milk fat AVEs are relatively low, with a mean of 9 percent 
and a range of 6 to 10 percent (CV of 27 percent). In contrast, the mean for the OQ 
milk fat AVEs is 58 percent with a range from 35 to 77 percent (CV of 31 percent). 
Many HTS lines in protein and whey have no or low fixed tariffs. For those 
subject to tariffs the AVEs are highly variable. The component AVEs for QT protein 
range from 4 percent to 98 percent with a mean of 51 percent, whereas the OQ protein 
AVEs range from 42 percent to 70 percent with a mean of 56 percent. Component 
prices have moderately narrow ranges in this group (the QT protein price range is  
from $818 to $1,366 per ton, and the OQ protein price range is from $9,329 to 
$9,617per ton). 
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The dried milk groups show the highest variation in world prices for products and 
components, and relatively large variation in the OQ tariffs at both the component and 
product levels. In the dried milk HF group, more moderate OQ and QT component 
tariffs are applied than in the cheese, milk fat, and protein and whey groups. However, 
the component tariff range is still wide. The dried milk HF group has low milk fat and 
protein QT AVEs, with means of 4 percent and 3 percent, respectively. The mean milk 
fat and protein OQ AVEs are significantly higher than the QT AVEs for this group: 24 
and 12 percent, respectively. 
Table 1  Summary of Descriptive Statistics for All Product Groups, 2004 
         World Price  Total AVE  Protein Price  Milk Fat Price  Protein AVE Milk Fat AVE
     ($/ton)  (%)  ($/ton)  ($/ton)  (%)  (%) 
average 4,926  17  8,895  8,891  5  7 
range (2,000-19,500)  (6-166)  (3,747-33,621) (3,744-33,621)  (3-9)  (4-12) 
Cheese QT 
CV 65%  169  64%  64%  29  27 
average 5,831  39  10377  10,375  14  20 
range (2,000-16,000) (13-220)  (3,534-27,586) (3,534-27,586)  (5-42)  (8-63) 
 OQ 
CV 51%  93  50%  50%  51  51 
average 1,924  9  NA  2,030  NA  9 
range (1,762-2,077)  (6-10)  NA (1,762-2,373)  NA  (6-10) 
Milk fat  QT 
CV 8%  27  NA  15%  NA  27 
average 2,535  58  NA  2,982  NA  58 
range (2,035-3,000)  (35-77)  NA  (2,035-4,000)  NA  (35-77) 
 OQ 
CV 15%  31  NA  26%  NA  31 
average 343  147  1,092  NA  51  NA 





CV 15%  133  36%  NA  130  NA 
average 2,405  63  9,473  NA  56  NA 
range (1,408-3,401)  (43-82)  (9,329-9,617)  NA  (42-70)  NA 
 OQ 
CV 59%  43  2%  NA  36  NA 
average 2,994  8  6,362  6,362  3  4 





CV 143%  90  159%  159%  113  74 
average 3,689  38  7,152  7,152  12  24 
range (1,194-11,067)  (15-61)  (2,095-25,404) (2,095-25,404)  (1-19)  (14  -55) 
 OQ 
CV 106%  39  127%  127%  60  65 
average 2,172  2  16,274  NA  2  NA 





CV 48%  43  68%  NA  42  NA 
average 4,043  31  54,924  NA  29  NA 
range (1,083-10,600)  (12-52)  (8,947-233,329) NA  (11-48)  NA 
 OQ 
CV 82%  44  160%  NA  46  NA 
Note: QT, OQ, CV, and AVE denote quota, over quota, coefficient of variation, and ad valorem equivalent, respectively. 
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The dried milk LF group’s average protein AVE tariff for QT is similar to that of 
the dried milk HF group, but protein price ranges are huge. For example, the protein 
price for OQ ranges from $8,947 to $233,329 per ton. This is due to the variation in 
the world prices of the intermediate products concerned. This translates into 
significant variation in the protein AVE tariffs (the dried milk LF group’s OQ protein 
AVEs have a CV of 46 percent, for example). 
Figures 1 and 2 show the component AVE tariffs across different product groups. 
From figure 1 the large amount of variation in OQ protein tariffs across cheese, 
protein and whey, dried milk HF, and dried milk LF groups can be appreciated. 
Depending on how protein is sourced, an importer could face an implicit tariff as low 
as one percent or as high as 70 percent. AVE tariffs range from one to 19 percent for 
protein sourced from the dried milk HF product group but from 42 to 70 percent for 
protein sourced from whey products. The results for OQ milk fat tariffs shown in 
figure 2 show a broadly similar pattern to those for protein. Current implicit over-
quota tariffs on imported protein and milk fat are highly variable.  
 
Figure 1  Protein AVE comparison between product groups, OQ, 2004. 
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Figure 2  Milk fat AVE comparison between product groups, OQ, 2004. 
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The substantial variability in implicit component tariffs is likely to affect 
importers’ decisions. There are many combinations of component AVE tariffs and 
prices within each component group. In order to minimize costs, importers are likely 
to choose intermediate products that provide components with the lowest landed price 
(combination of price and AVE tariff). The protection that is apparently provided to 
domestic dairy producers by the existing structure of tariffs on intermediate products 
may be undermined by the ability of importers to vary the pattern of imports to obtain 
components at the lowest cost. 
Analysis of Doha Tariff-Reduction Proposals 
ariff reductions for agricultural products are being addressed in the current Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations. Discussions have focused on the application of 
reduction percentages to a number of bands, defined on the basis of existing tariff 
levels. In addition, there may be tariff caps (maximum allowable rates) imposed by 
the end of the implementation period. At the time of writing the modalities of a final 
agreement were still uncertain. Consequently, we employ a particular set of 
assumptions to illustrate the potential impact of the type of approach being discussed 
at the WTO on U.S. dairy tariffs. Our focus is on how this approach might affect the 
structure of tariffs at the component level and how components would be sourced by 
importers should international dairy prices be below those in the U.S. market. 
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We base our analysis on the formula proposed by Ambassador Crawford Falconer, 
Chair of the WTO Agricultural Negotiating Committee (WTO, 2006). This formula 
would reduce tariffs as follows: 
• ad valorem equivalent greater than zero and less than or equal to 20 to 30 
percent – reduction of 20 to 65 percent; 
• ad valorem equivalent greater than 20 to 30 percent and less than or equal to 
40 to 60 percent – reduction of 30 to 75 percent; 
• ad valorem equivalent greater than 40 to 60 percent and less than or equal to 
60 to 90 percent – reduction of 35 to 85 percent; and 
• ad valorem equivalent greater than 60 to 90 percent – reduction of 42 to 90 
percent. 
Based on this formula, we define two scenarios: 
Scenario 1: A least aggressive tariff-reduction scenario employing the widest 
tariff bands with the lowest reduction percentages. For example, a band of zero to 30 
percent with a cut of 20 percent, and a band of 30 to 60 percent with a cut of 30 
percent. The other bands are defined for this scenario in a similar fashion. 
Scenario 2: A most aggressive tariff-reduction scenario employing the narrowest 
tariff bands and the highest reduction percentages. For example, a band of zero to 20 
percent with a tariff cut of 65 percent, and a band of 20 to 40 percent with a cut of 75 
percent. Again, the same combinations (narrowest band, highest reduction percentage) 
are used for the rest of this scenario. The parameters for the two scenarios are 
summarized in table 2. 
 
Table 2  Tariff Reduction Scenarios for OQ Products, Developed Countries 
Scenario 1: Least Aggressive Scenario    Scenario 2: Most Aggressive Scenario 
Bands (%)    Reduction percentages    Bands (%) Reduction percentages 
0-30   20    0-20  65 
30-60   30    20-40  75 
60-90   35    40-60  85 
>90   42    >60  90 
Note: There is no tariff cap for the least aggressive scenario and a tariff cap of 75 percent for the most 
aggressive scenario. 
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Based on these two scenarios, we estimate new component AVEs. Product-based 
AVE tariffs are ranked to determine which band they belong to. The reduction 
percentages shown in table 2 are then applied to the product-based AVE tariffs (i.e., 
total Uruguay Round AVEs). Finally, new component AVE tariffs are estimated using 
the methodology described earlier. 
Table 3 contains the means, ranges, and CVs for the new, reduced AVEs. As might 
be expected, average product-level and component-level tariffs decline under both 
reduction scenarios. With the exception of protein from the dried milk HF group, the 
relative variation in tariffs as measured by the coefficient of variation also declines. 
The relative variability in tariffs is lowest under the most aggressive reduction 
scenario (scenario 2). Although the relative dispersion of component tariffs decreases, 
an F test applied to normalized tariff variances indicates that the reduction is not 
statistically significant for 6 of the 21 cases. Consequently, we can conclude that the 
linear tariff-reduction approach has a limited impact on the tendency for the tariff 
profile to create incentives to vary the pattern of imports when milk components are 
considered. The reduction formulas do not eliminate the issues identified earlier with 
respect to the sourcing of imported components. 
 
Table 3  Different Reduction Scenario Statistics Comparison, for All OQ Product 
Groups, 2004 
  

















average 14  20  10  14  3  4 
range   (5-42)  (8-63)  (4-24)  (6-37)  (2-4)  (3-6)   Cheese 
CV  51 51 39 39 20 19 
average NA  58  NA  38  NA  7 
range   NA  (35-77)  NA  (24-50)  NA  (6-9)  Milk fat 
CV  NA 31 NA 28 NA 13 
average 56  NA  37  NA  7  NA 
range   (42-70)  NA  (29-46)  NA  (6-7)  NA 
Protein 
and 
whey  CV 36  NA  31  NA  8  NA 
average  12 24 9 17 3  5 
range   (1-19)  (14-55)  (1-13)  (11-36)  (0.4-4)  (3-6)  
Dried 
milk 
high fat  CV  60 65 60 58 67 22 
average 29  NA  21  NA  6  NA 
range   (11-48)  NA  (9-34)  NA  (4-7)   NA 
Dried 
milk low 
fat  CV  46 NA 39 NA 20 NA 
Note: OQ, AVE, and CV denote over quota, ad valorem equivalent, and coefficient of variation, 
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Despite this limited effect, as component AVEs are reduced, particularly under the 
most aggressive reduction scenario, a more consistent pattern of protection is created. 
There is a tendency for the AVE tariffs at the component level to become less diverse. 
An importer would face less variability in implied tariffs on milk fat or protein across 
intermediate products. This would be likely to contribute to a more predictable trading 
environment. 
Summary and Conclusions 
he impact of tariffs on intermediate products can be difficult to predict, 
particularly when such products can be divided into components from which 
other products are made. Most imported dairy products are used in further processing, 
and their demand is increasingly related to component characteristics. Imported dairy 
products can face very different tariff levels, and the implicit tariffs on components 
can be highly variable. Shifts in import patterns may result if changes in tariffs affect 
the relative prices of components obtained from various intermediate products.   
In this article, we examined the existing tariff profile for U.S. dairy imports and 
two scenarios for tariff reductions based on proposals made in the Doha Round 
negotiations. The focus on tariffs on a component basis highlights some of the 
potential consequences of the current Doha Round of WTO negotiations for the U.S. 
dairy industry. 
Current implicit tariffs for milk fat and protein vary substantially among and 
within dairy product groups. This variation has implications for the sourcing of 
ingredients. Food manufacturers seeking to minimize costs will tend to base their 
purchasing decisions on the lowest component price (inclusive of tariffs) rather than 
the lowest product price. Import protection for products such as butter and skim milk 
powder can be circumvented by importing other products whose fat or protein content 
faces lower implicit tariffs. 
Proposed changes in tariffs under the Doha Round negotiations seem likely to 
both lower the average implicit tariff on components and reduce tariff dispersion. 
Importers would face less variation in component prices, and the incentives to switch 
among products based on differences in implicit component tariffs would be reduced. 
Product and component tariff profiles under a Doha Round agreement would be more 
consistent than under the existing tariff schedule.  
Although the net trade position of the United States in dairy products can change 
depending on the levels of domestic and international prices, imported sources of 
protein are generally cheaper than domestic sources. Imported OQ skim milk powder 
is an exception. Doha Round tariff-reduction rates are unlikely to make imported OQ 
skim milk powder cost competitive either with other imported protein sources or with 
domestic sources. Importers already have cheaper options through non-TRQ products 
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such as milk protein concentrate and casein. Domestic sources of milk fat are 
generally cheaper than imported sources under the current tariff schedule, but a larger 
number of imported sources of fat would become cost competitive with Doha Round 
tariff reductions.  
In conclusion, the results of this inquiry suggest that tariff-reduction formulas 
could have unanticipated impacts on imported intermediate products. The users of 
imported dairy products may be able to find new lower cost options for obtaining 
ingredients as a result of changes in tariffs, when international product prices are 
below those in the United States. It will only be possible to determine the likely 
effects of the current negotiations by examining changes in implied tariffs at the 
component level if and when a final agreement is reached. 
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